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Information governance is becoming an important aspect of organisational 
accountability. In consideration that information is an integral asset of most 
organisations, the protection of this asset will increasingly rely on 
organisational capabilities in security.  In the medical arena this information is 
primarily sensitive patient-based information. Previous research has shown that 
application of security measures is a low priority for primary care medical 
practice and that awareness of the risks are seriously underestimated. 
Consequently, information security governance will be a key issue for medical 
practice in the future. Information security governance is a relatively new term 
and there is little existing research into how to meet governance requirements. 
The limited research that exists describes information security governance 
frameworks at a strategic level. However, since medical practice is already 
lagging in the implementation of appropriate security, such definition may not 
be practical although it is obviously desirable. This paper describes an on-
going action research project undertaken in the area of medical information 
security, and presents a tactical approach model aimed at addressing 
information security governance and the protection of medical data.   
Keywords: Medical informatics computing, computer security, security 
measures, data security, action research. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Like most organisations, medical practice is increasingly dependent on IT 
systems and data in electronic form. The information used is both 
administrative and clinical in nature. In addition, like e-commerce, the 
boundaries for health provision are becoming blurred. Where once the family 
doctor was the main provider of healthcare, the services have become 
distributed (Williams and Mahncke, 2006).  The increased push for shared 
electronic health records compounds the security issues in this environment. 
There is a need to ensure a secure and trusted environment for the use and 
transference of sensitive personal information.  Von Solms (2000, 2006) 
describes the ‘waves’ of information security as technical, management, 
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standardisation and most recently information security governance. Whilst the 
corporate world has faced these waves head on, the medical profession has 
been slow to progress past the first wave. The existing tactical policy approach 
taken by organisations to information security is becoming inadequate as it 
does not reflect the changing electronic environment and its attendant risks, nor 
does it address the increasingly important issue of accountability. This research 
confirms the slow progression through Von Solms’ waves, and provides an 
overarching practical model for medical practice to follow in order to secure 
their medical information, and thus generate defensible information 
governance. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Information governance is a relatively new idiom and echoes corporate 
governance in its concern with accountability and fiduciary duty. Essentially it 
encompasses integrity, including audit and control, risk management and 
compliance. Similarly, information security governance extends the definition 
of information security (confidentiality, integrity and availability) to 
incorporate the legal and regulatory aspects of the context in which the IT 
security is used. These definitions imply accountability at the highest level of 
the organisation. Well known corporate failures in this area include Enron and 
more recently WorldCom, and have given rise to legislation for senior 
management responsibility such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley, 
2002). These examples show that directors and CEOs are ultimately 
responsible for the safety and security (in all its facets) of information in an 
organisation (Von Solms, 2006).   
In the face of strong penalties for violations of corporate governance directives, 
it is time that organisations paid more attention to the protection of information 
assets. Understanding the liability that organisations are open to is a strong 
motivator for change in regards to security practices. In the medical field, such 
protection has been encapsulated in legislation in some countries, for example 
in the Unites States there is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA). However, other countries such as the United Kingdom, the 
European Union and Australia do not have such defined legal statutes and rely 
on national privacy laws (Heiser, 2004; Hinde, 2003).  
Similarly, to fully appreciate how security contributes to governance, the 
difference between information security management and information security 
governance must be understood. Information security management is wholly 
contained within information security governance. It is the process of 
attempting to comply with legal and professional requirements, which is a key 
part of information governance. It has been a criticism that “information 
security is often treated solely as a technology issue, when it should also be 
treated as a governance issue” (Business Software Alliance, 2003, p.2).  
In the medical arena, the purpose of information security governance is to 
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protect all health-related information to ensure confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. However, more than this it is to ensure business continuity and 
mitigate the risks of litigation by demonstrating and proving best practice and 
robust procedure compliance. The process of governance must be integrated 
with other standard processes if it is to be effective. A complementary review 
of ISO17799/AS7799, ISO27001, HIPAA and other relevant security and 
medical security standards can be found in Williams (2006c).  
Surveys have shown that information security problems arise frequently from 
human negligence rather than intentional attack (Cosgrove Ware, 2004) and at 
the same time there has been a decline in the adherence to security standards. 
Approximately 50% of intentional attacks are from current or past employees, 
yet statistics in security show that over half of security breaches are never 
reported. The 2006 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey suggests 
that it is the users’ attitudes and resulting behaviours towards security practice 
that requires the most attention and pose the greatest challenges for 
organisations today. The survey reports that less is being spent on security than 
in previous years, yet still only 10% of organisations consider that they manage 
their computer security at an acceptable level. Concurrent with this is a decline 
in the adoption and integration of IT security standards. Many security 
incidents can be attributed to a lack of appropriate protection as a result of 
inadequate staff awareness of security procedures and a poor security culture. 
These surveys suggest that whilst increasing security awareness and 
implementing measurable security activities is challenging, they may have the 
greatest protective effect on security.  In medical practice, these security issues 
have been shown to be greatly underestimated and therefore it is imperative 
that the security research provides assistance to this area of society (Holzer & 
Herrmann, 2002; Williams, 2005). 
2.1 Existing Information Security Governance Frameworks 
Information governance and information security governance are immature 
concepts and hence there is limited literature on the subject and even fewer 
models and frameworks. The literature that does exist views information 
security governance as a strategic function.  
Moulton and Coles (2003) proposed that security governance should comprise 
strategic objectives for security with strategies to meet these objectives, 
identification  of responsibilities and practices together with the associated 
resources management, risk assessment, and regulative compliance. In 
addition, they suggest that information security governance is “the 
establishment and maintenance of the control environment to manage the risks 
relating to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and its 
supporting processes and systems” (Moulton & Coles, 2003, p.581). However, 
this definition specifically omits the audit function, the operational security 
activities and future development. It clearly focuses on applying information 
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security governance at a strategic level.  
In comparison, Posthumus and von Solms (2004) also classify information 
security governance as an executive management responsibility. Their work 
presents a framework for how information security can be dealt with at the 
strategic level. The framework includes a ‘direct and control’ view of 
information security governance, comprising both governance and 
management responsibilities. This sees executive vision, strategy, and policy in 
governance as ‘direct’, and the implementation and reporting from the 
management side as ‘control’.  
From a software security viewpoint, the National Cyber Security Partnership in 
the US also proposed a framework specifically defining information security 
governance in terms of the roles of executive management (Business Software 
Alliance, 2003; Entrust, 2004; National Cyber Security Summit Task Force, 
2004). This approach centres on business drivers, responsibilities and metrics, 
and defines the actions needed to be taken by management to meet governance 
through engagement of strategic management.   Other organisations such as the 
IT Governance Institute have also published resources that specify 
“information security is not only a technical issue, but a business and 
governance challenge that involves adequate risk management, reporting and 
accountability. Effective security requires the active involvement of executives 
to assess emerging threats and the organisation’s response to them” (IT 
Governance Institute, 2006, p. 8).  
The existing frameworks indicate that governance is a management issue and 
should be initiated and controlled from this strategic organisational level. The 
authors identified as the major contributors in the field of information 
governance all indicate that the frameworks have been developed to provide 
assistance in meeting information governance. Further, they acknowledge that 
more support is required to interpret the directives at a tactical and operational 
level.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
This research is part of an information systems based, action research project.  
The objective of the research is to formulate practical models of assistance for 
primary care medical practices to improve their security practices. Action 
research was chosen as the overarching methodology because its cyclic nature 
supports investigation and intervention in real-world situations (Baskerville, 
1999; Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996; Dick, 2002; Susman, 1983; 
Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). Action research is “widely cited as an exemplar 
of a post-positivist social scientific research method, ideally suited to the study 
of technology in its human context” (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996). It 
allows for situational assessment, question raising, planning, fieldwork, and 
analysis/reflection of interventions leading to sustainable improvement.  
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It is imperative to involve those who would use and be affected by the 
research, particularly in the medical domain where there has been a natural 
opposition to investigation into, and challenge of, current processes (de 
Dombal, 1993). Action research is one research methodology which fits the 
primary care environment where both technological and human factors are 
present, and where strong emphases on quality solutions are essential.  Further, 
it has been shown that collaborative research between researchers and 
participants works well in the medical context where the purpose is to improve 
the adoption of appropriate research findings (Hoddinott & Pill, 1997). Such 
qualitative research, as action research principally is, can assist in 
understanding the processes and capabilities of individuals in the health setting, 
and promoting sustainable change (Muecke, 1997).  A detailed discussion of 
the research process can be found in Williams (2006a).  
The research initially employed an exploratory pilot study, followed by in-
depth semi-structured interviews with primary care medical practices. The pilot 
study aimed to investigate what issues were present in medical practice in the 
use of electronic information. The research subjects were single and group 
practitioners in private primary care practices in Australia. The results of this 
study indicated that security and trust were significant issues in the use of 
electronic information. After this initial action research cycle, the results were 
critically reviewed and, consistent with the evolutionary nature of the action 
research paradigm (Dick, 1993), further literature investigation was carried out. 
This led to a refinement in research objectives and the initial development of 
the model presented in this paper. Further, it motivated the development of a 
security specific questionnaire based on the four competing security factors:  
demographics, actual practice, issues and barriers, and practitioner 
perception (Figure 1). These distinct competing factors in security were 
chosen because of their importance to the existent social information system 
and to the technological solutions that may be in place.  
 
 
Figure 1. Competing factors in information security (Williams, 2006a). 
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Information security research is often seen as one of the most intrusive and 
sensitive types of information systems research. There exists a general mistrust 
of any person outside an organisation attempting to gain information about the 
security and security practices (Chang & Ho, 2006). Several researchers report 
that to gain meaningful data in security it is preferable to use a small sample 
and build relationships with those participants (Chang & Ho, 2006; Kotulic & 
Clark, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998).  Furthermore, to effect change using 
action research, trust needs to be fostered with the participants in order to 
undertake intervention in the target environment as the participants are 
inclusive in the research. For these reasons the interviews were conducted with 
group medical practices in Australia and the UK, with whom a relationship 
could be developed. Each practice has a networked medical records and 
administration system with access to the Internet. The participants share 
information within the medical practice and seek information from the Internet. 
The UK practice also shares information over the UK NHS Spine. Following 
the data collection and analysis, the model was refined.  
4. RESULTS 
The results are a snapshot of the extensive qualitative interview data collected. 
They provide examples of key factors in relation to responsibility, legal 
requirements, and improvement in information security. All practices have a 
networked computer system for administration and clinical records. Little 
delineation of security roles was apparent. In relation to responsibility and the 
question ‘Who is responsible for maintaining the security of your electronic 
information?’ respondents reported: 
“Well I suppose it has to be me [as Practice Manager]…although because 
of the connections that we have to the [NHS] Spine, now I don’t know how 
that changes my roles as far as security, as I do not really have any remit to 
control them”; and  
“At the moment it’s me [doctor] and then later on I will designate it to my 
wife who is trained in IT so she can handle that”. 
The interviews revealed identical approaches to security, which was reliance 
on existing security measures provide by the application software and some 
influence of profession accreditation requirements.  In ‘actual practice’, whilst 
policy was seen as important and acknowledged as a necessity, formal written 
policy was either non-existent or not well developed. Secure access was 
handled almost exclusively by the facilities available in the software 
application packages used. The most obvious exception to this was the backup 
procedures, which were well defined and usually formally written down.  
Respondents revealed little explicit knowledge of the legal responsibilities 
associated with security of electronic information. It should be noted though 
that this does not preclude interviewees having tacit knowledge of the required 
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obligations. In relation to the legal requirements and the question ‘Are you 
aware of the practice responsibilities from a legal perspective in relation to the 
security of your electronic information?’ respondents said: 
“We get people to sign a confidentiality agreement”; 
“I know it’s under some sort of act but I can’t quote on it. I just know it has 
to be as confidential as possible and I’m sure that’s all they [laws] are 
trying to say”; and  
“There is an awareness. I don’t know the detail. I know it’s the practices’ 
responsibility to ensure the confidentiality of all patient related 
information. There is a legal implication on me being the administrator of 
the records, to ensure that those are all protected. I wouldn’t know the 
detail of the legalities”. 
In regards to security perception, there was a consistency between practices 
where all interviewees thought that the application software used provided 
sufficient protection in terms of security. Further, although some auditing and 
security metrics are recorded, albeit automatically by application software and 
the operating system, the interviewees revealed that these metrics are not 
monitored. Such audit data could however partially fulfil some requirements of 
information governance and could be used to review and inform security 
processes. They may also be a key factor in the process of risk assessment. 
Consequently improvement in information security was investigated through 
the following questions: 
1. What do you think constitutes good information security practice?  
“I think it has to be up to the individual who’s doing it, I think you’ve 
just got to be checking it all the time I think that’s the only security 
you’ve got isn’t it you can’t rely on the computers to do that for you so 
I think it’s monitoring constantly”; and  
“We have to have a robust policy that is clearly communicated to all 
people who use the building to serve the patients”.  
2. What do you think would improve information security in your practice? 
“I think we have to educate the staff more, especially the ones who are 
not computer literate, that would definitely improve security”; and  
“We don’t monitor [security] its just too much time and human 
resources”; and  
“I think an alarm system for the building, the protocols for email and 
the internet, would be something I need to look at sooner rather than 
later. That would cover the physical side and the educational side”.  
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3. What are the issues in implementing security in the practice?  
“The biggest issue was the need to look at it. It’s now on the strategic 
document and there is now a recognition that we need to do something. 
Knowledge is an issue for me. Where to gain that knowledge is also an 
issue”; and  
“We have some user issues, i.e. the capabilities of some of the staff. 
They vary completely from the new partner who is really switched on, 
to the one who used to be a typist who has come on board as an 
excellent receptionist”. 
In summary, the data collected identified the following issues: 
? No clear delineation of responsibility for security; 
? Risk assessment is not undertaken; 
? Policy is usually ‘ad hoc’ and not in written form; 
? Security measures are often implemented incorrectly or poorly 
including monitoring of existing measures; 
? The capability and understanding of staff is in question in regards to 
security; 
? Education of staff is required; and  
? More appropriate procedures could be put in place. 
These characteristics are key operational aspects of information assurance and 
governance.  
Upon reflection the participants all reported that there was more that could be 
done but time was an issue. In addition, policy was seen as a key constituent of 
good information security practice. Increased knowledge and training, together 
with more strategic direction, were identified as important issues that needed 
addressing. Lastly, staff awareness and capability was seen as a fundamental 
gap in the security implementation at each medical practice.  
5. DISCUSSION 
As a result of the pilot study, a literature investigation into current security 
practices in primary medical care was undertaken. This, together with a review 
of existing information governance models resulted in the first iteration of the 
model. The model was further refined using the interview data collected into 
the ‘Tactical Information Governance Security Model’ (TIGS Model) as shown 
in figure 2.  The model presented is specifically drawn using total quality 
management (TQM) notation as this reflects the process and function of each 
step in the model (Ahire, 2001). The following section discusses how the TIGS 
model was constructed and explains its functioning.  
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5.1 Model Construction 
The model was derived from a synthesis of the literature and interview data 
using three discrete yet convergent constructs. The first constructor was a 
review of the literature on current information governance thinking, where it 
was noted that there exists a discrepancy between the compliance to 
information governance objectives and the operational management tasks to 
meet these objectives (von Solms, 2005). This is further confirmed by the 
interview data concerning the responsibilities and legal requirements of 
information security. Therefore in the top level of the TIGS model there was a 
need to ensure that the legal, ethical and professional responsibilities are 
explicitly understood. This requires that a separation of duties and 
identification of roles in security management are clearly defined within the 
medical practice. The data collected suggests that practices do not have 
dedicated security aware staff and that these roles are taken on by the doctors 
themselves or the practice manager – neither of whom are trained for this role. 
The second constructor was a review of existing information security 
management practices. This resulted in a separation of associated processes 
into defined modular steps (as indicated by the dotted arrows on the left hand 
side of the figure 2). Usually this is termed merely ‘risk assessment’, which is a 
basic security process however it can be further refined into several tasks. In a 
medical application this should include:  
? Identification of assets to be protected (Williams, 2006d);  
? Risk assessment to obtain an overview of the anticipated threats and 
risks to data (Williams 2006b);  
? Development of policies and procedures for those responsible for 
security, and other staff, to follow (Williams, 2006c); and 
? Implementation of protection measures appropriate to the environment.  
Whilst this delineation of tasks is adequate, it is not sufficient given the 
medical context. Thus, a third constructor was used. As can be seen from the 
data, improvement in information security, what constitutes good information 
security practices as reported by the respondents is reasonable, yet such 
measures are not conformed to or effectively implemented. Further, the 
respondents identify that capability, as well as time, are significant issues. 
Therefore, a capability assessment module was added to the model which can 
then inform and drive the subsequent procedures, protections and controls.  
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Figure 2. Tactical information governance security model (TIGS Model). 
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5.2 Model Function 
The model specifies three prerequisites in order to make the governance 
process effective. These are: 
? explicit knowledge of legal requirements in the use of patient and other 
medical data held electronically; 
? awareness of ethical and professional responsibilities in the practice of 
medicine and in the provision of healthcare; and 
? identification of the roles and responsibilities of staff and management 
in the governance process.     
These pre-requisites provide a contextual basis for the remainder of the 
governance process.  
The first three operations in the model are:  
? Asset identification – this is identification of all assets of the 
information environment. This comprises both computer and 
information assets, such as hardware, telecommunications and 
networking equipment, software programs and operating system, human 
resources, and patient, management and other clinical support data. 
Further, practice policies and personnel intellectual property are also 
assets to be protected and therefore should be included (Williams, 
2006d). 
? Risk assessment - this process identifies the potential threats; matches 
assets to the potential threats; assesses the level of risk to an asset and 
the impact of the threat if it was successful; correlates the vulnerability 
(level of risk of a threat to an asset); and assigns control measures to 
each threat/asset combination   (Williams, 2006b); and  
? Policy implementation – policy is the driver for operational 
procedures. The policy is driven by the legal regulation, professional 
accreditation and established industry best practice (Williams, 2006c). 
Ethical considerations that may override security must also be 
considered. 
The results of the research indicate that these three areas require substantial 
elucidation and explanation to enable medical practices to implement them 
effectively.  
The next organisational function of the model is capability assessment. An 
analysis of access practices, together with the marginal delineation of the 
security responsibility role, reflects the trustful environment within which these 
are conducted. Despite some security measures being in place, the research 
results indicate that awareness of the security risks is minimal and that the 
capability of the practice to understand, and meet the legal requirements, is 
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equally minimal. This evidence indicates significant gaps in knowledge and 
execution of security practices. Thus, capability assessment is an essential 
component of the TIGS model. It is envisaged that this capability will 
necessarily be context specific and will include capability metrics for the 
medical practice.  
Procedure development is the next key aspect of implementing effective 
security governance. The model specifies that procedure development should 
be performed to reflect the capability of the medical practice whilst still 
meeting the strategic intent of security requirements. To aid the evaluation of 
the governance process, metrics should be embedded into the resulting 
procedures. Further, the implementation of protection and controls must be 
consistent with capability and allow external support to enhance capability if 
required. This operation is dependent on the controls selected and may be 
technology and socially based. These may include technical education in 
security measure implementation and education to increase awareness of 
security. The final operation is the evaluation of metrics and possible external 
validation to meet the requirements of compliance monitoring and regulatory 
directives. It is envisaged that the compliance monitoring may be able to be 
embedded in the capability assessment and in the procedures used based on 
these capabilities. The model is seen as a continuous process rather than a 
discrete set of steps, and thus requires review and reiteration to be current and 
effective.  
As the model indicates, information security management is an integral part of 
information security governance. This model is more inclusive than 
information security management, in that it focuses on validation of the 
process and procedures as evidentiary from a legal perspective. Yet more than 
this, the model is differentiated by the inclusion of a capability assessment to 
inform procedures development. The capability assessment model will provide 
a substantive security metric that is derived from original requirements for the 
context to which it is applied, in this case primary care medical practice. The 
model is designed to provide an overarching structure for improvement in 
security operation, implementation and execution. The modular structure of the 
model means that it can be employed incrementally and each module in itself 
may improve the overall security awareness and operations in the medical 
practice. It is specifically developed to be utilised by non-IT and non-security 
skilled medical and administrative staff, although such skilled personnel would 
also benefit from the model.  
5.3 Model Review 
The model was reviewed by five general practitioners and three security 
experts. Reviewers were asked whether they understood the model, their 
perception of its practicality, ease of implementation and possible omissions 
and improvements. All respondents commented that the model was 
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understandable, although some doctors did not fully comprehend all of the 
processes without supplementary explanation. Also, all reviewers indicated 
that TIGS was a practically oriented model and addressed an area deficient in 
medical practice. One general practitioner said it provides a “practical solution 
to increase awareness and security for patient data in General Practice, which is 
currently lacking” and another commented “it’s very interesting to see the 
model like this. It is the sort of thing we don’t usually try to reduce into an 
algorithm or a set of steps”. This was agreed with by another doctor: “I think 
there needs to be a template. I think there needs to be an understanding of what 
the pathways and processes are and the requirements of compliance at a 
practice level”.  
Compliance monitoring, including the affect of outside influences such as the 
Government, was raised as a key area of deficiency in current practice. It was 
suggested that the compliance process could be linked to medical association 
accreditation, to ensure it meets minimum professional standards. One security 
expert commented that the model is focused on process and procedure and not 
just on technical implementation. Therefore it provides a holistic view of 
security within a given context. Each procedure is coupled tightly with the 
next, and as a result “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”. Another 
security expert suggested that distinguishing between the strategic and 
operational aspects would be the next step in implementing the model.  Perhaps 
the review can be summed up by one doctor who commented that “governance 
is becoming more important for the patient as well as for the legal 
requirements. It’s amazing that it has taken so long to come up with this 
[model] as I have been recording records electronically for over 20 years”. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The immaturity of ‘information governance’ and the lack of research into its 
application within the security discipline suggest that there is a need to develop 
models of governance that can be practically applied. Medical practice has 
been identified as one area that to date has been sluggish in its adoption of 
security and is therefore open to greater security risk. The model presented in 
this paper provides a method for mitigation of security risk whilst meeting the 
requirements of information security governance within a corporate 
framework. Whilst it is acknowledged that information security governance 
should be a strategically driven process, this research proposes an applied, 
interventionist and tactical approach be adopted for information security 
governance in medical practice. This is particularly necessary given the 
indicated lack of security awareness and capability displayed by primary care 
medical practices within this study.  Although the TIGS model approach to 
improving security in medical practice is theoretical and operational testing has 
not yet been undertaken, subsequent research is developing the capability 
assessment process of the TIGS model. Following this, the model will be tested 
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in several general practices in Australia and the UK. This future research will 
bridge the gap between the theoretical models of security and practical 
implementation of such models. This will ultimately provide practical guidance 
in improving security practices consistent with best practice and the strategic 
intent of information security.   
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